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Abstract 
 
This paper investigates the extent to which clients were able to influence performance 
measurement appraisals during the downturn in commercial property markets that began in 
the UK during the second half of 2007.  The sharp change in market sentiment produced 
speculation that different client categories were attempting to influence their appraisers in 
different ways.  In particular, it was recognised that the requirement for open-ended funds to 
meet redemptions gave them strong incentives to ensure that their asset values were marked 
down to market.  Using data supplied by Investment Property Databank, we demonstrate that, 
indeed, unlisted open ended funds experienced sharper drops in capital values than other 
fund types in the second half of 2007, after the market turning point. These differences are 
statistically significant and cannot simply be explained by differences in portfolio 
composition. Client influence on appraisal forms one possible explanation of the results 
observed: the different pressures on fund managers resulting in different appraisal outcomes. 
 
 
Means, Motive and Opportunity? Disentangling Client Influence on Performance 
Measurement Appraisals 
 
Introduction 
 
Due to the low liquidity of commercial real estate, appraisals are required in order to mark 
assets to market.  As a result, the appraisals play a key element in financial reporting, lending 
decisions, performance measurement and transactions.  Appraisals often provide a metric to 
measure financial ratios, fund managers‟ bonuses and security in lending decisions.  
Consequently, clients can have clear incentives to influence them.  Existing research on the 
ability of clients to influence the outcome of the property appraisal process has tended to 
indicate that clients are able to use a number of sources of influence to alter appraisal 
outcomes.  However, it has had little to say on whether influence is likely to be pervasive or 
involve isolated instances.   
 
The sharp market downturn commencing in the second half of 2007 provides an opportunity 
to measure the extent to which clients are able to influence appraisal outcomes.  During this 
period, anecdotal reports suggested that it was recognised by market participants that different 
types of client may have had different motivations to attempt to influence appraisals.  
Contemporary reports from practitioner conference debates in both the UK and Europe (see 
for example, IPE Real Estate, 2009 and EG Capital, 2008) comment on concerns with 
appraisals in the downturn.  In particular, the issue of loan-to-value (LTV) covenants for 
banks and the speed with which appraisers mark-to-market for open ended property unit trusts 
have been highlighted. 
 
The main dilemma for appraisers in this period was that, as trading became thinner, there 
were few indicators of pricing levels from asset sales and it was thus considered difficult to 
quantify the extent of market falls.  Open-ended unlisted real estate funds (particularly unit 
trusts with a NAV-based redemption rule) had incentives to ensure that the appraisals of their 
commercial property assets accurately reflected current market levels.  On the other hand, 
closed-ended unlisted funds, institutional investors and REITs/property companies, who do 
not have similar pressures to meet investor redemptions, were reported (albeit anecdotally) to 
be much more resistant to downward adjustment in appraisals without strong supporting 
evidence from transactions.  Decreases in appraisal figures for assets providing security for 
loans may result in a breach of LTV covenants. However, this paper concentrates on the 
performance measurement valuation issues caused by the downturn. 
 
 
 
In order to shed some light on the ability of clients to influence the outcome of their 
appraisals,  we examine appraisal-based capital values for different types of UK real estate 
investor in the falling market of 2007 and 2008. Using data supplied by Investment Property 
Databank, we demonstrate that, indeed, unlisted open ended funds experienced sharper drops 
in value than other fund types in the second half of 2007, after the market turning point. These 
differences cannot simply be explained by differences in portfolio composition and are 
consistent with differences in valuation processes employed by different fund types. Client 
influence on valuation forms one possible explanation of the differences observed. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: we begin with an overview of client 
influence studies in real estate and then discuss the valuation process. Next, the market 
context for the study – the turn in the market from mid-2007 - is set out. We then conduct 
empirical tests on a dataset of UK returns provided by Investment Property Databank to seek 
any evidence of client influence. Finally, conclusions are drawn.            
 
Background and Context  
Client Influence: A Definition 
 
Whilst there have been a number of studies investigating the ability of clients to influence 
appraisal outcomes, an accepted definition has not emerged.  In the literature, the terms 
„feedback‟, „pressure‟ and „influence‟ tend to be used interchangeably.  Implicit in most 
analyses is that client influence involves client manipulation of the appraisal production 
process with the aim of systematically biasing appraisal outcomes.   Bias can be both positive 
and negative.  Whilst most studies have focussed on clients‟ attempts to „ramp‟ appraisals 
above the appraisers‟ „uninfluenced‟ estimates of Market Value, clients may, in some 
circumstances have incentives to pressure appraisers to reduce appraisals below their 
„uninfluenced‟ estimates.  This has been the main theme of much of the research conducted to 
date on client influence.   
 
However, influence can also be tacit or covert.  The outcomes of professional services may be 
affected by the professional‟s perception of the preferences or requirements of the client so 
that they over-identify with those interests and may become advocates rather than 
independent “scorekeepers”.  For instance, Cloyd and Spilker (1999) found that tax advisors, 
although required by professional standards and statute to produce accurate assessments, 
tended to overemphasise evidence supporting their clients‟ position.  In the real estate context, 
Gallimore and Wolverton (2000) point that appraisers‟ estimates of Market Value may be 
biased by the anticipated (adverse) reaction of their client. A similar point is made in relation 
 
 
to valuers acting as expert witnesses by Crosby et al. (1998).  Further, clients can influence 
the client more covertly by providing information, such as an agreed transaction price, that 
may influence the appraiser. 
 
Client influence on appraisal outcomes may also result from concern with quality assurance.  
In this respect, clients may assist the appraiser by providing information about the asset or the 
market about which the appraiser may be unaware.  Further, clients may also monitor the 
appraiser to ensure that sufficient effort is being applied.  It is also common for expert clients 
to check appraisals for errors or omissions.  While the overt goal of this type of client 
intervention is to improve the quality of the appraisal rather than to bias it, there may be 
implicit biases introduced.   
 
In addition, the client can affect appraisal outcomes inadvertently.  Decisions relating to 
choice of valuer, provision of information (e.g. transaction price), detailed instructions etc 
may impinge on the appraisal outcome without any explicit intention on the part of the client.  
Since, as discussed below, the appraisal outcome will be a function of the information 
available to the appraiser and how individual appraisers process this information, 
consequences of inadvertent client impacts will be unintended and produce noisy effects on 
appraisal outcomes.  
 
The Supply of Appraisal Services 
 
The structure of appraisal sector in the UK may be a significant variable in terms of the ability 
of appraisers to resist client pressure.  Large firms, in particular, may be in a better position to 
resist client pressure due to their information resources, reduced dependence on individual 
clients and ability to inflict reputational damage.  However, in the UK there has been some 
concern at the consolidation of appraisal services delivery into a small number of large 
service providers.  Baum et al (2000) found that the market for performance measurement 
appraisal in the UK had experienced substantial consolidation.  Economies of scale and 
competition had reduced the ability of many smaller firms to compete for high volume, high 
frequency, low fee periodic appraisal work.  At this time the Investment Property Databank 
(IPD) aimed to have no more than 25% of the valuations undertaken by a single firm – this 
objective was later breached by the merger of CB Hillier Parker  and Insignia (Richard Ellis).  
 
It was reported to the Carsberg Committee that, as at December 2000, 65% (by capital value) 
of the property covered by the IPD annual index was valued by the top five valuation firms.  
For the monthly index (as at November 2001), 80% of properties were valued by the top five 
 
 
firms, with  62% being appraised by the top three valuation firms alone. These concentrations 
are now approximately 54% and 69% for the top three and top five firms respectively in the 
annual and quarterly indices (as at December 2008) and 66% and 75% for the top three and 
top five in the monthly index (as at May 2009).   
 
Carsberg, concerned with this concentration, recommended that the RICS sponsored a regular 
analysis of the Investment Property Databank to monitor the movements of valuations 
undertaken by the five largest firms in the index for any differences.  This recommendation 
was taken on by the five largest firms; ATISREAL, CB Richard Ellis Ltd, DTZ, Jones Lang 
LaSalle and Knight Frank, in collaboration with IPD. These major firms are therefore made 
aware of how their valuations “perform” relative to their peers. Two studies have so far been 
undertaken in 2004 and 2008 (IPD, 2008).  The IPD press release on the June 2008 study -
which would have included the first part of the downturn in 2007 – comments: 
 
“The contributions of each of the five largest firms, which together make up over 
80% of the valuations in the IPD Monthly Index, were analysed across ten 
segments of the market and found to display high levels of synchronisation with 
respect to capital movements and the major yield drivers of those movements. 
Further, this synchronisation has improved markedly over the past 18 months” 
 
This apparently close relationship between the appraisals of the major firms suggests that 
differences in capital returns between owners should not be due to potential concentrations of 
client type in individual firms.  
 
Appraisal Formation 
 
In order to understand how appraisals can be influenced by clients, it is useful to appreciate 
first the process by which appraisals are formed.  Whilst there are a range of different 
categories of appraisal, the key events in the appraisal process are typically instruction, 
information collection, appraisal calculation, client consultation and delivery.  Clients can, 
and sometimes do, use the opportunity to influence appraisals at a number of points in this 
chronology.  This can range from „opinion shopping‟ prior to formal instruction (prevalent in 
the property lending sector, see Crosby et al, 2004) to selective information provision to 
coercion at meetings to discuss draft appraisals.  Baum et al (2000) in the UK and Levy and 
Schuck (1999) in New Zealand both found that draft valuation meetings were normal in the 
performance measurement valuation process. In the UK, this led to the RICS producing 
guidance within their mandatory Practice Statements (Red Book) concerning the recording of 
the outcomes of these meetings, including any changes to valuations (RICS, 2008, PS 6.11, 
commentary note 2). 
 
 
At one level, the appraisal production task can be modelled as a set of „textbook‟ routines or 
procedures that become institutionalised through professional guidance, education and 
training.  For appraisers, having identified the objective, the appraisal task essentially 
involves information collection, information processing and output generation.  Indeed, there 
is a body of research that investigates how appraisers deviate from normative models due to 
an heuristic bias (see Diaz, 1990).  In the UK, many of these appraisal functions have been 
transformed by ICT and the associated adoption of specialist appraisal software and growth of 
market information services.  However, it is also important to recognize that that there is a 
range of categories of appraisal that have different purposes, contractual requirements, 
frequencies and remuneration structures.  For instance, even within periodic appraisals, 
McAllister et al (2004) found that the end-of-year appraisal required more information 
collection, site visits etc. compared to „standard‟ monthly appraisals.   
 
In terms of technical calculation, appraisal production involves the processing of a bundle of 
factual and market-derived information.  Key factual issues related to location, physical 
characteristics, lease terms and rents paid.  For leased commercial assets, estimates are 
required concerning of tenant quality, capitalization rates, Market Rents and costs.  
Increasingly this information is processed using specialist valuation software packages.  In 
real estate appraisal models for income generating assets, asset value represents the 
discounted sum all future net incomes.  Assuming constant growth, the value (V) can be 
expressed as: 
 
       (1) 
 
 
where V is the current capital value, Rt is rental income, Ct is the periodic costs of owning the 
asset (management, vacancy, refurbishment etc - so that Rt – Ct = Net Operating Income), g is 
a constant growth rate, i is the target rate of return (composed of the risk-free rate of return 
plus a risk premium), and t is the life of the asset. Since freehold ownership is unlimited, this 
can be taken as a perpetuity and approximates to 
 
       (2) 
 
where i – g is a capitalization rate.  So: 
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When used in practice, capitalization rates are usually estimated from analysis of transactions 
involving the sale of comparable assets rather than by estimating target rates of return and 
constant growth rates.  Although this approach is linked to the discounted cash flow method, 
it is fundamentally a comparison method.  Due to the lease structures in the UK, the rent paid 
and future uplifts tend to be calculated separately so that  
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where n is the period for which the rent paid is fixed.  There are a number of variations of this 
approach that can produce different valuations.  However, common to all conventional 
appraisal methods is that the key variables that need to be estimated are the Market Rent and 
capitalization rate.  These tend to be obtained from analysis of transactions involving 
comparable properties.  Due to the characteristics of commercial real estate markets, there is 
inherent uncertainty in their estimation. 
 
The quality and quantity of information on transactions involving comparable properties are 
central to inherent uncertainty in real estate appraisals.   This uncertainty is important since it 
provides scope for different interpretations of market information.  Quan and Quigley (1991) 
formally outlined this point arguing that observed transaction prices can be interpreted as 
being equal to unobservable true prices plus some market-wide and idiosyncratic transaction 
noise.  Assuming a single comparable, current capitalisation rates can be expressed as a 
function of  
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Where CRt is the current estimate of capitalisation rate, CRcompt-1 is the capitalisation rate 
generated by a comparable, MMt,t-1 is market movement since the transaction involving the 
comparable, ecompt-1 is idiosyncratic noise in CRcompt-1 and et is a random error term. 
Appraisers have to extract the relevant price signal from the "noisy" transaction prices 
involving comparables. This produces are three main problems for an appraiser.   
 
First, due to intrinsic timing issues, the reliability of a market price signal decays in 
proportion to the quantity of exogenous market movements.  Second, price signals from 
observed transaction prices contain deviations from „true‟ price levels due to individual 
characteristics of assets, buyers and sellers.  Whilst the first problem is innate, the second may 
be mitigated in deep markets by rich information flows.  However, thin trading in commercial 
real estate markets results in poor information flows.  Finally, the heterogeneity of 
 
 
commercial property assets requires further appraiser subjectivity in interpreting price signals 
generated by unique assets.   
 
In essence, there is scope for a range of interpretations by market participants of a pricing 
signal.  This is because, relative to the asset being appraised, the prior transaction took place 
in different market conditions, involved a different asset and was generated by the interaction 
of unique buyers and sellers.  These factors contribute to appraisal uncertainty and appraisal 
variation1 and, most significantly in this context, provide a valid basis for appraisals to be 
contested.  
 
Previous Research 
 
Clearly, given the ethical, reputational, tort and even criminal issues raised by client influence 
on appraisals, conducting empirical research on this sensitive topic is fraught with 
methodological issues concerning the reliability of findings.  Although there have been a 
number of studies of client influence in several countries, there have been very few studies 
that measure linkages between observed client pressure and observed appraisal outcomes.  
Studies have been based upon postal questionnaires, semi-structured interviews or 
experimental work focussing on appraisers‟ experiences of client pressure or on their 
responses to hypothetical scenarios.   
 
In one of the earliest empirical studies in the US, Smolen and Hambleton (1997), found that 
over 80% of respondents to a postal questionnaire believed that other appraisers would 
respond to client pressure to change appraisals.   Yu (2002) found a similar result in a 
questionnaire survey of appraisers in Singapore.  41% of residential and commercial 
appraisers responding to a postal questionnaire in the US posing hypothetical client pressure 
to revise a valuation said that they would move their appraisal (see Kinnard, Lenk and 
Worzala, 1997 and Worzala, Lenk and Kinnard, 19982). Focussing on valuations for loan 
purposes, in studies of UK and US appraisers again based on postal questionnaires, Gallimore 
and Wolverton investigated whether appraisers reframed the valuation task in response to 
client feedback as to validate sale price rather than to estimate Market Value (see Wolverton 
and Gallimore, 1999 and Gallimore and Wolverton, 2000).  Whilst they found mixed results 
according to whether respondents were residential or commercial appraisers, overall they 
found little evidence of systematic reframing.  Presenting different scenarios to mortgage 
                                                 
1 i.e. disagreement between appraisers. 
2 Their study found that client size relative to firm turnover was a significant factor influencing the 
decision to change the appraisal.  
 
 
valuers, Hansz (2004) found that higher appraisals were provided by appraisers supplied with 
information suggesting that their appraisal would have implications for repeat business from 
the client.  Building upon the types of study conducted above, researchers in Nigeria have 
found similar evidence of client influence in this market (see Amidu, Aluko and Hansz, 2008, 
Amidu and Aluko, 2007).  However, given the sensitivities of this topic noted above, it is 
likely that such studies are biased towards underestimating the extent of client influence. 
 
Perhaps more revealing have been in-depth personal interviews with appraisers.  For instance, 
focussing on loan related valuations, in their questionnaire survey of appraisers in the UK, 
Crosby et al (2004) found that, whilst appraisers acknowledged pressure from borrowers and 
brokers, they reported that were able to resist such pressure so that there was no effect on 
appraisal outcomes.   However, research using in-depth interviews with appraisers involved in 
appraisals for performance measurement has found some clients do exert overt pressure to 
change valuations but also provide information to appraisers that is „favourable‟ (see 
McAllister et al., 2004; Levy and Schuck, 1999; and Levy and Schuck 2005).  Baum et al. 
(2000) found that appraisers acknowledged that, following meetings to discuss drafts of the 
appraisals, a proportion of appraisals were changed and that most of the changes produced 
increases.  However, it is difficult to quantify the effects of client influence.  As researchers 
have also found, appraisers can develop strategies to resist client pressure.  More 
fundamentally, in an interview situation, it is possible that appraisers may anchor on atypical 
or one-off, incidents.   
 
Whilst McAllister et al (2004) simply asked appraisers to estimate the amount of appraisals 
that were amended following a meeting with the client to discuss the draft figures, the 
interviewee estimates were essentially „ballpark‟ figures. For US office assets, Graff and 
Webb (1997) inferred client influence from findings of persistence in patterns of performance.  
They identified persistent low long-term returns in office submarkets which featured 
“frenzied acquisitions” explaining it in terms of agency costs (Graff and Webb, 1997, 30).  It 
was argued that such persistence was due to incentives (bonuses, fee structures) for fund 
managers to acquire assets and to overbid for assets in a highly competitive market.  In turn, 
appraisers were incentivised to reflect this mispricing in their early periodic valuations until 
eventually realistic pricing emerged producing poor performance.   
 
Using interviews of both appraisers and clients, Baum et al (2000) found that appraisers were 
willing to admit pressures from clients who stood to gain from bonuses based on 
outperforming benchmarks.  They suggested these clients would use the draft valuation 
meeting to attempt to push appraisals higher.  However, pressure to reduce appraisals was 
 
 
also reported in particular circumstances.  For instance, fund managers taking over new funds 
might pressure valuers to  reduce the initial valuation, to provide a low baseline for future 
performance measurement.  Again, funds managers intending to sell properties might wish to 
ensure that they did not have to sell at below the latest appraisal. 
 
The Market Context  
 
The UK commercial real estate market experienced a major boom and slump in the 2000s. 
Between February 2002 and June 2007, the IPD UK monthly capital value index rose for 65 
consecutive months. Over that period, capital values increased by 53% - 8.2% per annum in 
nominal terms, 4.7% in real terms. Capital values began falling in July 2007; as at May 2009, 
they had fallen for 23 consecutive months. Capital values fell some 12% in the second half of 
2007 and by a third from their peak to the end of 2008. At December 2008, the UK IPD 
monthly capital value index stood at a lower level than at March 2000.  In general, there 
seems to be a consensus within the industry that the appraisal profession in the UK have 
managed to perform well in the difficult conditions associated with rapid market falls.  The 
tone of much of the commentary is summed up by IPD‟s Head of Systems and Information 
Analysis, Ian Cullen who has commented  
 
“In the most unstable and unprecedented market circumstances for very many 
years, UK valuers have demonstrated their ability to respond speedily to 
exceptional changes in sentiment despite the thinness of the evidence available to 
them.” (IPD, 2008)”. 
 
The rapid turnaround in market trajectory inevitably caused problems for property investors 
and fund managers. However, the problems vary across client types. Open ended funds face 
particular problems – particularly unit trusts with defined redemption policies based on the 
last published net asset value (NAV). For funds without strong cash reserves, redemptions 
could only be made through asset sales – implying selling property into a falling market. 
Furthermore, given evidence that appraisals tend to lag the market, the prior NAV might not 
have fully adjusted for value falls. Faced with such problems, funds could attempt to freeze 
redemptions (although many were not allowed to do so because of their regulatory status), 
they could increase bid-ask spreads, or seek to raise new capital – an avenue not available to 
them in the falling UK market.. They thus had strong incentives to “encourage” their 
appraisers to mark values down as hard as possible, to overcome any lagging effects, to 
ensure that NAV-based unit prices were as low as possible. Many also increased the 
frequency of calculation of NAV to fortnightly – which would force appraisers to use non-
transactional data to adjust prior valuations.  
 
 
Figure 1, The UK Commercial Real Estate Cycle 
Source: authors, IPD, ONS. 
 
Unlisted closed end funds and property companies faced different pressures. For property 
companies, the widespread belief that NAV is a factor determining equity prices provided an 
incentive to seek to maintain capital values at higher levels. For closed-ended funds that were 
highly geared, sharply falling capital values created risk of breaching LTV covenants, again 
creating an incentive to encourage less bearish valuations. Finally, fund managers and asset 
managers whose remuneration included a performance component – the beating of an 
absolute or relative benchmark target – again had incentives to encourage higher, rather than 
lower, valuations.  
 
The nature of client pressure, therefore, differed across fund types. At the same time, valuers 
were faced with much greater uncertainty since, as a consequence of the falling markets, 
transaction volumes fell markedly. The number of property transactions recorded on the IPD 
databank fell by 28% from 2006 to 2007, and by a further 13% from 2007 to 2008. Both 
property sales and acquisitions in 2007 were, as a percentage of total properties in the 
databank, at levels last seen in the early 1990s, While overall transaction volumes were still 
comparatively high compared to many European markets, within individual sub-markets, 
there would have been limited comparable evidence and some concern about the open market 
nature of individual transactions. This uncertainty might be hypothesised to create greater 
scope for client influence over individual valuations.  
 
 
 
Figure 2: Transaction Volumes, UK Commercial Real Estate 
Source: authors, IPD 
 
This market environment presents an opportunity to test for client influence effects based on 
market evidence rather than on interviews, surveys or artificial experiments. Given that there 
are different client incentives, there might be discernible differences in capital value shifts 
between fund types. In particular, we might expect to see open ended funds exhibit larger and 
earlier falls in capital values than other fund types as the market turns. The next section 
examines this possibility empirically.  
 
Empirical Analysis 
 
Investment Property Databank provided quarterly performance data broken out by fund type, 
running to September 2008. Due to standard confidentiality constraints, we only have 
aggregated fund level data, with no information on individual funds or individual property. 
We focus here on the turn in the market in the second half of 2007, examining the fall in the 
third quarter of 2007, the second half of 2007 and the fall from peak capital values to 
September 2008. If there are client effects related to the unit redemption value, the 
expectation would be that open ended funds will exhibit larger and faster falls in capital 
values than other fund types. Aggregate analysis at fund level provides some initial support 
for such a proposition. As Table 1 shows, capital values for open ended funds fell by over 
13% in the second half of 2007, 222bp more than the overall movement of funds in the IPD 
databank. While open ended fund value falls are more muted, relative to other fund types, in 
the first half of 2008, the fall to September 2008 from the peak value in June 2007 is 25.4% - 
a greater fall than any other fund type. Property companies have the lowest fall in values from 
peak to Q3 2008, while closed end funds had the lowest fall in the second half of 2007.  
 
 
While these results are not inconsistent with a hypothesis of client influence, they by no 
means constitute proof. First, given the aggregated nature of the data, it is not possible to test 
whether the differences are statistically significant with any robustness. Second, there are a 
number of other possible explanations for the difference. Firstly, given the concentration of 
appraisal service providers, it is possible that certain types of client may be over-represented 
in particular firms.  However, it is notable that the IPD valuation correlation study has not 
picked up any differences in client base. It is likely that findings will not be biased by 
differences in concentrations of clients in specific valuation firms.  Secondly, the portfolios 
held by open ended funds may differ from those held by other funds, in terms of sector, 
geographical distribution, size or quality of building or other attributes that might influence 
the aggregate return. For example, at Q3 2007, by comparison to insurance companies and 
pension funds, open ended funds were over-weight in offices and under-weight in retail. Were 
offices to underperform relative to retail, then the larger falls in value exhibited by open 
ended funds could simply be a compositional effect. In fact, retail property experienced 
greater falls in value than office property in the second half of 2007, so this sector level 
weighting cannot explain the differences observed.  
 
Table 1 Capital Returns By Client Category 
 
Fund Type Fall H2 2007 Fall H1 2008 Fall from Peak 
Closed Ended Funds  -9.03% -10.50% -23.07% 
Open Ended Funds -13.25% -7.95% -25.43% 
Pension Funds -9.95% -8.70% -22.50% 
Insurance Companies -10.66% -8.82% -23.54% 
Property Companies -10.31% -7.40% -21.68% 
All Funds -11.03% -8.86% -23.84% 
Source: Authors, IPD.  
 
While these results are not inconsistent with a hypothesis of client influence, they by no 
means constitute proof. First, given the aggregated nature of the data, it is not possible to test 
whether the differences are statistically significant with any robustness. Second, there are a 
number of other possible explanations for the difference. Firstly, given the concentration of 
appraisal service providers, it is possible that certain types of client may be over-represented 
in particular firms.  However, it is notable that the IPD valuation correlation study has not 
picked up any differences in client base. It is likely that findings will not be biased by 
differences in concentrations of clients in specific valuation firms.  Secondly, the portfolios 
held by open ended funds may differ from those held by other funds, in terms of sector, 
geographical distribution, size or quality of building or other attributes that might influence 
the aggregate return. For example, at Q3 2007, by comparison to insurance companies and 
 
 
pension funds, open ended funds were over-weight in offices and under-weight in retail. Were 
offices to underperform relative to retail, then the larger falls in value exhibited by open 
ended funds could simply be a compositional effect. In fact, retail property experienced 
greater falls in value than office property in the second half of 2007, so this sector level 
weighting cannot explain the differences observed.  
 
Figure 3 The Turning Property Cycle: Fund Type Effects 
Sources: IPD, authors.  
 
To directly analyse portfolio composition effects, incorporating both sector and geographical 
impacts, the fund data was analysed using the IPD Portfolio Analysis Service (PAS) 
categories3. These provide eleven segments arranged by sector and geography (for example 
City of London offices, industrial property in the South East, retail warehouses). We used the 
PAS quarterly returns and the market capital weight in each fund type to estimate a 
hypothetical return series for each type of fund – the returns that would apply if there were no 
differences in valuation movement across fund type. The hypothetical capital return for a fund 
type i at time t is given by: 
                                                 
3 See Devaney and Lizieri (2005) for an analysis of the homogeneity of PAS categories. Clearly there 
is considerable individual property variation within each segment. However, there may be sufficient 
aggregation here to reduce the impacts of such noise.  
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where is the wikt is the weight of capital for fund type I in PAS segment k at time t and Rkt is 
the capital growth for PAS segment k at time t. This provides a more sensitive benchmark for 
analysis of differential valuation effects. Owing to the masking of results by IPD for 
confidentiality reasons, only three fund types can be analysed at this level of detail; open 
ended funds, pension funds and insurance companies.  
 
Figure 4 compares hypothetical benchmark and actual open ended fund capital values with 
the overall IPD capital growth between 2004 and 2008. The overall IPD and hypothetical 
benchmark indices track closely. However, the actual open ended fund performance index 
both peaks at a lower level and falls away more sharply. From the June 2007 turning point to 
Q3 2008, the hypothetical benchmark falls 22.9%, while the actual index falls 25.4%. This 
difference is economically significant: the market capitalisation of the actual index is some 
£630 million or 3.2% below the hypothetical benchmark capital value. By contrast, the 
insurance and pension fund actual capital values closely track their hypothetical benchmarks 
– and the overall market. Figure 5 shows the equivalent growth path for pension funds. 
Finally Figure 6 estimates “abnormal return” – the difference between hypothetical and actual 
capital growth by quarter – between Q3 2005 and Q3 2008. It is readily evident that the major 
downward relative adjustment in open ended fund capital values occurred in the fourth 
quarter of 2007, where capital value falls were some 2.5% greater than would have been 
expected given the sector and geographical composition of the portfolio.  
 
Figure 4: Actual and Hypothetical Benchmark Capital Values, Open Ended Funds  
Source: authors, IPD. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Actual and Hypothetical Benchmark Capital Values, Pension Funds 
Source: authors, IPD. 
 
Figure 6 “Abnormal Return”: Hypothetical Less Actual Capital Growth 2005-2008 
Source: authors, IPD 
. 
 
The PAS level analysis allows some further exploratory statistical testing. The value falls for 
individual PAS segments were compared across fund types. For each of the eleven PAS 
segments, the open ended funds experienced greater value falls than pension funds or 
insurance companies over the second half of 2007; for eight of the eleven PAS segments, 
 
 
open ended funds experienced greater falls in value from the June 2007 peak to September 
2008. In both cases, a standard chi squared test suggests that there is a statistically significant 
relationship between fund type and fall in value. For the second half of 2007, χ2 = 33.3; for 
the fall to September 2008, , χ2 = 28.9. Both are significant at the 0.001 level (the critical 
value for 4df is 18.46). 
 
As a final test, the fall in capital values for fund-level PAS segments in the second half of 
2007 was examined using a regression approach. There are 45 fund level PAS values – the 33 
from the open ended funds, pension funds and insurance companies and a further 12 segments 
from property companies and unlisted closed end funds. The returns from these fund level 
segments are regressed on a set of characteristic or attribute variables. 
 
where Rjkt is the capital return in time period t for PAS type j and fund type k, C is a constant 
(reflecting overall market movement) and Ai is the ith attribute variable reflecting a 
characteristic of that fund-type segment. If i is significantly negative, it means that attribute i 
is associated with a stronger fall in capital values in time period t than would be expected in 
relation to the overall market and other characteristics. Thus, if open ended funds are 
associated with sharper falls in market, then one might anticipate a significant negative 
coefficient.  
 
In addition to fund type, a number of other variables or attributes were tested. These included 
an estimated initial yield (the rent passing divided by the market capitalisation in December 
2006) and mean property value (market capitalisation over number of properties at December 
2006) which might act as a proxy for prime (class A) versus secondary property; the growth 
in value between December 2005 and June 2007, to test whether markets that had grown 
fastest also fell fastest; and a series of sector and segment dummies to capture property and 
location factors. The proxies for property quality did not explain variation across segments in 
capital value falls. Combinations of fund type, sector and segment enabled around half the 
variation in capital value falls: in all the models, the open ended fund attribute was 
statistically significantly different from zero and had a negative sign.  
 
A parsimonious version of the regression model is shown in Table 2. Here, open ended funds 
and retail warehouses are seen to have a significant negative effect on capital growth while 
closed end funds and “other” property has a weak positive impact on capital growth, with 
around 50% of the variation in capital growth explained. The strong intercept reflects the high 
jktiijkt
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correlation between segments, as all parts of the market declined across the second half of 
2007. The model has been estimated using heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors and 
covariances; however the attribute nature of the explanatory variables and specification issues  
do raise some question about robustness. Nonetheless, the results support the idea that open 
ended fund values were marked down earlier and more sharply than other fund types as the 
market turned in the second half of 2007. 
 
Table 2 Regression Output 
 
Dependent Variable: Capital Value Change, H2 2007 
Variable Coefficient T-Statistic Probability 
Constant -0.099 -29.88 0.000 
Open Ended Fund -0.027 -3.25 0.002 
Closed Ended Fund +0.021 +1.69 0.098 
Retail Warehouse -0.047 -7.59 0.000 
“Other” Property Type +0.045 +1.81 0.078 
    
Adjusted R-Squared 50.4%   
Standard Error  0.025   
F Statistic 12.182 Prob (F) 0.000 
N Obs = 45, White robust standard errors and covariance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
The dramatic change in market sentiment commencing in the second half of 2007 produced 
speculation within the commercial real estate market that different clients were attempting to 
influence their appraisers in different ways.  In particular, it was recognised that the 
requirement for open-ended funds to meet redemptions gave them strong incentives to ensure 
that their asset values were marked down to market.  Echoing similar problems in illiquid 
derivatives and securities markets, appraisers were in a difficult position since the decline in 
transaction activity meant that they had little evidence of market pricing levels.  Further it was 
suggested that clients without the same incentives to mark to market (and sometimes with 
counter-incentives) were resisting sharp downward adjustments to asset appraisals without a 
credible evidence base.  This market environment provides an opportunity to investigate the 
extent to which clients could systematically bias appraisal outcomes. 
 
 
 
There is a substantial literature on client influence on appraisals based mainly on 
experimental or survey research methods.  In this paper we have attempted to analyse actual 
appraisal data rather than rely on these methods.   The appraisal formation process is well 
documented and the opportunity for client influence is inherent in this process.  From 
previous research, it seems clear that clients do have the motivation to influence the result 
and, in particular, the draft valuation meeting provides ample opportunity.  Intrinsic 
uncertainty in appraisals provides the means.  Improvements in the regulation of appraisals in 
the UK include protocols for recording the outcome of meetings to discuss draft appraisals. 
However, there is no research or information on whether these are effective in restricting the 
opportunity to influence.  At the time of writing the RICS is consulting on more aggressive 
monitoring of appraisals and appraisers. 
 
We have, given the limitations of the data imposed by the confidentiality arrangements with 
IPD, attempted to strip out any influences of any differences sectoral composition of 
portfolios of different client types.  Having done this, we find that appraisal-based capital 
return of the open ended funds fell further than for other client types during the period June 
2007 until December 2008.  In the initial stages of the downturn from a lower peak and then 
maintains this differential through to the end of the analysis period in September 2008. 
 
Before any adjustment for differences in portfolio structure, capital values for open ended 
funds fell by 2% more than the overall movement of funds in the IPD index. In the first half 
of 2008, open ended funds do not fall quicker than the valuations for other client types 
however, the fall to September 2008 from the peak value in June 2007 is 25.4% - a greater 
fall than any other fund type. These greater falls are mainly based on office values with retail 
and industrial showing greater similarity between different client groups. 
 
After adjusting for differences between the portfolio structures, the results continue to show a 
difference for the open ended funds, the results indicate that the open ended funds were 
valued at 3.2% less than the “hypothetical” portfolio, while insurance companies and pension 
funds showed no difference to the hypothetical portfolio. Further exploratory tests indicated 
that the falls in capital values for open ended funds were statistically significantly greater than 
those of other fund types, even when corrected for portfolio composition effects, with the 
differences being most marked in the first half of 2007. 
 
The UK valuation industry has received praise for the speed in which it has marked values 
downwards as the market turned. Nonetheless, open ended fund managers were arguing 
publicly, even in late 2008, that values still did not reflect or lagged “market reality”. It seems 
 
 
likely that such funds would have  made still more robust comments in draft valuation 
meetings. Our evidence is consistent with a model in which fund managers with different 
incentives to mark values down or to mute market falls were affecting valuation practice.  The 
minutes of draft appraisal meetings might constitute a valuable source of evidence in this 
context, were they available. More robust statistical analysis would strengthen the results but 
would require either individual fund level or, better, individual property level data over the 
market cycle.      
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